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Abstract 
 
This article provides an empirical assessment of China’s state price policies and strategies in 
relation to (1) market-rebuilding for the agricultural sector and (2) food security  for China.1 It 
traces main changes in government grain pricing, urban food subsidies, grain procurement and 
the administrative control over food circulation from 1979 to 2006 in a bid to transfer a non -
market economy to a market one, commonly known as the post-Mao reforms.  
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1
 The World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition of food security is three-fold: food availability, food access and food 
use; see WHO. “Food Security,” http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/. Accessed 12 January 2016.  
 I. Introduction 
 
When Mao died, a market economy had been absent in Mainland China for about 
three decades. Rather, the stiff administrative control over resources and resource 
allocation in the name of the Soviet centrally planned economy was the 
economy-wide norm in all sectors. As a result, economic efficiency was low, and 
the economic structure and growth were severely distorted.
2
  
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the post-Mao Era (i.e. after 1976) began in the 
food sector and were marked by a re-introduction of property rights and 
economic incentives among producers.
3
 Despite the grassroots initiatives, under 
a party-state, China’s reforms have been clearly state-led and state-promoted.4 
Moreover, changes were very gradual without the “shock therapy” of the Russian 
type.
5
 In this context, the visible hand of a Gerschenkron state was busy in 
creating or rebuilding a food market for the economy, simultaneously handling 
both the demand and the supply sides.  
                                                             
2
 See e.g. Lin, Justin Y., “Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959–1961,” Journal of 
Political Economy 98/6 (1990): 1228–52; Lardy, Nicholas R., Agriculture in China’s Modern Economic 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Feuchtwang, Stephan and Athar Hussain 
(eds), The Chinese Economic Reforms (London: Croom Helm, 1983); Perkins, Dwight H., “Reforming 
China’s Economic System,” Journal of Economic Literature 26/2 (1988): 601–45; Li, Li-an and Keyang 
Zheng (eds), Deng Xiaoping Yu Gaige Kaifang Shisi Nian (Deng Xiaoping and Fourteen Years of 
Reforms and Opening Up) (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 1993); Fan, Qimiao and Peter 
Nolan (eds), China’s Economic Reforms (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994); Leng, Shao-chuan, 
Reform and Development in Deng’s China (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994); Larus, 
Elizabeth F., Economic Reform in China, 1979-2003: The Marketization of Labour and State 
Enterprises (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005).  
3
 See e.g. McMillan, John, John Whalley and Lijing Zhu, “The Impact of China’s Economic Reforms 
on Agricultural Productivity Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 97/4 (1989): 781–807; Lin, Justin 
Y., “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China,” American Economic Review 82/1 (1992): 34–
51.  
4
 White, Gordon, The Road to Crisis: The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform (London: 
Macmillan, 1991).  
5
 Fan, Qimiao and Peter Nolan (eds), China’s Economic Reforms: The Costs and Benefits of 
Incrementalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994).  
It was a mammoth task. Under Maoism, food supply in the urban sector was 
heavily protected by the state. Urban food was strictly rationed at artificially low 
prices, sometimes even lower than the production cost. A direct consequence was 
the stifling of all state procurement prices for rural products which in turn 
stagnated the incentives, growth and development of the farming sector;
6
 not to 
mention the unprecedented famine in peace time and with good weather during 
the late 1950s and early 60s.
7
 In this context, the Maoist state acted as the sole 
food dealer between the food consumers and producers, and between the urban 
and rural sectors. Prices, if any, were used for accounting purposes only, as the 
consumer had no power to decide how much to eat and what to eat, while the 
producer was not allowed to decide when and where to grow what food, for 
whom, and by how much.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms endorsed the incentives of producers in the farming 
sector. This was achieved by the implementation of the “household contractual 
production responsibility system” (jiating shengchan chengbao zeren zhi) in the 
early 1980s, which empowered the producers for the first time since the 
communist takeover in 1949. Overnight, the peasantry became price sensitive 
again like their ancestors, ready for marketisation of rural produce.  
There was however a caveat: a three-decade-long exploitative and harsh 
“food dictatorship” that was adopted by Mao from Lenin to squeeze as much 
surplus food as possible from the peasantry.
8
 This led to a chronic farming 
recession to threaten China’s food security (see Table 1). Any reduction in food 
prices would cause an even deeper recession in the farming sector. In other words, 
the revitalisation of China’s agriculture after Maoist mismanagement 
necessitated higher food prices.  
 
                                                             
6
 Deng, Kent G., China’s Political Economy in Modern Times: Changes and Economic Consequences, 
1800–2000 (London: Routledge Press, 2011), pp. 128–40; Deng, Kent G., Mapping China’s Growth 
and Development in the Long Run, 221 BC to 2020 (London: World Scientific Press and Imperial 
College Press, 2015), pp. 157–61.  
7
 Dikötter, Frank, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 
1958-1962 (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).  
8
 For “Food dictatorship” see Ryan, James, Lenin’s Terror, the Ideological Origin of Early Soviet State 
Violence (London: Routledge Press, 2012), pp. 101–22.  
Table 1. Internal Food Import-Export Balance under Maoism (10,000 tons) 
 
 
South China 
(1) 
North China 
(2) 
China’s total 
(3) 
Pre-collectivisation    
1953–5 688.5 204.3 892.8 
Post-collectivisation    
1956–60 1,950.5 –472.0 1,478.5 
1961–5 669.5 –2,013.5 –1,344.0 
1966–70 942.0 –796.5 145.5 
1971–5 952.5 –1,159.0 –206.5 
1976–8 –22.8 –1,106.4 –1,129.2 
 
Source: Based on Contemporary Agricultural History Study Group, Rural Economy Institute, Ministry 
of Agriculture (eds), Dangdai Zhongguo Nongye Biange Yu Fazhan Yanjiu (A Study of Agricultural 
Reforms and Development in Contemporary China) (Beijing: China’s Agriculture Press, 1998), pp. 251.  
Note: Negative figures mean food imports to bridge domestic food deficits.  
 
There was, however, an institutional asymmetry. The consumers in urban 
China, accounting for about 20 percent of the country’s population, were not yet 
ready for the market for food. Despite the government commitment to “forced 
industrialisation” which seemingly favoured the urban working class, 9 Maoism 
systematically halved China’s urban real wages.10 So, the “living wage” under 
Mao was built in name. As a result, even with government subsidies, urban food 
consumption had to be strictly rationed, or a famine would sweep across Chinese 
cities. Fundamentally, this combination of food-ration and food subsidies was 
determined by the absence of a labour market that set urban living wages at a 
market rate. As the re-establishment of an urban labour market appeared much 
later, food-rationing and food subsidies in the urban sector – the signature pattern 
of resource allocation under the Soviet central planning – had to continue. Low 
food prices were politically safe for the state.  
                                                             
9
 For the term, see Spulber, Nicolas, Organizational Alternatives in Soviet-type Economies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 209–16.  
10
 Deng, Kent G., Mapping China’s Growth and Development in the Long Run, 221 BC to 2020 
(London: World Scientific Press and Imperial College Press, 2015), pp. 168–9.  
Consequently, although rural producers began to react to the price signal 
from the food market, urban consumers still responded to non-market signals of 
rations and subsidies. This rural-urban dichotomy and mismatch was responsible 
for “dual prices” for the same commodity (shuangchong jiage), as a result of 
different paces of reforms in the two key sectors of the economy.  
It was now up to the post-Mao reformist state to somehow bridge the two 
sides of supply versus demand which represented two fundamentally different 
economies: an increasingly marketised economy and a moribund planned 
economy. It was a tall order. The reformist state acted as the “substitute for the 
missing market” à la Alexander Gerschenkron.11 Its role was three-fold: (1) to 
create the price signal for the newly emerged market economy in the rural sector, 
(2) to fade out gradually the failed planned economy in the urban sector in 
conjunction with the re-establishment of an urban labour market with a real 
living wage at a market rate, and (3) to obtain food security for the country as a 
whole. These three major tasks were not always compatible with one another, 
which was the root cause of the government food policy swings during the period 
in question.  
In the very beginning, such a “Gerschenkron state” acted as a price-giver for 
both the demand and supply sides. For the rural price-taking producers and urban 
price-taking consumers, the state represented the “proxy market demand” for 
food and the “proxy market supply” to distribute the same food. Both rural 
producers and urban consumers relied on the state prices to make choices and 
decisions. In such a system, it was not just a zero-sum game between the rural 
and urban sectors. If the procurement prices were set too low, the case shrank. So, 
China’s annual aggregate food output, and hence food availability and food 
security for China, was at the mercy of the state monopsonic prices for rural 
output.  
Technically speaking, the state was an arbitrager between the two sides but it 
was by no means a rent-seeker. Rather, as we will show, the state lost money in 
its arbitraging.  
                                                             
11
 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962).  
The current study reveals that it is an illusion that with all  the resources it 
controlled, China’s almighty party-state was fully capable of assuring the 
country’s food security with ease. This was not the case. As far as one can tell, 
China’s food security was not that secure during the period in question. For the 
years 1983–95, China’s grain output grew merely in pace with its population. 
Although food supply increased ahead of the population during 1996–9, it fell 
behind population growth in the period 2000–6 (see Figure 1-A). China’s per 
capita food fluctuated violently, meaning that the country’s food security was 
sometimes in jeopardy (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Fluctuations in Food Output and Per Capita Food Stock, 1979–2006 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: 
China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2007).  
 
The deep reason lies in the budget constraint faced by the Gerschenkron state. 
The budget available directly impacted on the food stock produced by the rural 
sector: a larger food procurement budget allowed a higher monopsonic price and 
hence lured the peasantry to produce more food stock for the country; and vice 
versa. Assuming all individual farmers were rational economic agents who made 
their production decisions according to their expected future revenue from their 
grain sales,
12
 it was the responsibility of the monopsonic state to set the “right 
price” for food. Meanwhile, urban labour market reforms turned out to be slow 
                                                             
12
 Schultz, Theodore W., Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1964).  
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and apathetic, which forced the government to spend more on urban food 
subsidies rather than reducing them (see Figure 2). So, in both circumstances the 
“right price” depended on the depth of the government pocket to pay, 13 ceteris 
paribus. If so, the issue of budget constraint loomed large.  
 
Figure 2. Urban Food Price Subsidies and Government Food Expenditure  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian (Finance Yearbook of China) 
(Beijing: China’s Finance Magazine, 1991–2007).  
 
Our study is inspired by economists who link Chinese agriculture to 
government food policies, and food security.
14
 The existing literature usually 
                                                             
13
 Here, the Chinese state did not behave like a “developmental state” that purposely “gets the prices 
wrong” in order to change the growth trajectory of the economy; see Amsden, Alice H, Asia’s Next 
Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 139. Rather, the main concern was how to “get 
the prices right” for China’s food security.  
14
 E.g. Kueh, Y. Y., “China’s New Agricultural-Policy Program: Major Economic Consequences, 
1979–83,” Journal of Comparative Economics. 8/4 (1984): 353–75; Ash, Robert F., “The 
Evolution of Agricultural Policy,” China Quarterly 116 (1988): 529–55; and his “The Peasant 
and the State,” China Quarterly 127 (1991): 493–526; Lin, Justin Y., “An Economic Theory of 
Institutional Change: Induced and Imposed Change,” Cato Journal 9 (1989): 1–33; and his  
“Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China ,” American Economic Review 82/1 (1992): 
34–51; Sicular, Terry, “Redefining State, Plan, and Market: China’s Reforms in Agricultural 
Commerce,” China Quarterly 144 (1995): 1020–46; Huang, Jikun and Scott Rozelle, 
“Technological Change: Rediscovering the Engine of Productivity Growth in China’s Rural 
Economy,” Journal of Development Economics 49/2 (1996): 337–69; Fan, Shenggen, 
“Technological Change, Technical and Allocative Efficiency in Chinese Agriculture: the Case of 
Rice Production in Jiangsu,” Journal of International Development 12/1 (2000): 1–12.  
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assesses China’s food policies with various output data. Such an approach 
commonly refers to farming inputs such as new chemical fertilizers,
15
 new seed 
varieties,
16
 better irrigation and farming machinery.
17
 These inputs are 
quantified in physical terms. Unlike physical inputs, institutions and their effects 
are not always quantifiable. Thus, input-output analysis is routinely conducted as 
a proxy for any institution-output inquiry.
18
 The challenge is whether the 
input-output proxy is able to reveal the mechanisms with which institutions 
influence producers’ incentives and decisions and by how much. So far, few 
studies have paid sufficient attention to how government price policies impacted 
on China’s food output, urban wage bill and national food security. This work 
fills in this gap in scholarship.  
Our source of information comes mainly from decrees and regulations of the 
central government in Beijing. The government motives fell into two main 
categories: monopsonic availability and fiscal affordability. Due to data 
availability,
19
 our observations are made for the period from 1979 to 2006 when 
China moved step by step towards marketisation of food, including procurement 
pricing (1979), bilateral contractual procurement (1984), abolition of urban grain 
rationing (1993), new regulations on procurement fund (1995–6), grain bureau 
                                                             
15
 See Fan (2000), and Ma, Nathaniel, Peter Calkins and Johnson Stanley, “Technological and 
Allocative Efficiency vs. Equity in Shuyang County, Jiangsu: General Household vs. 
Specialized Households,” in John Longworth (eds), China’s Rural Development Miracle: with 
International Comparisons (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1989). 
16
 Lin, Justin Y., “The Household Responsibility System Reform and the Adoption of Hybrid 
Rice in China,” Journal of Development Economics 36/2 (1991): 353-72; Lin, “Rural Reforms 
and Agricultural Growth;” Jin, Songqing, Hengyun Ma, Jikun Huang, Ruifa Hu and Scott 
Rozelle, “Productivity, Efficiency and Technical Change: Measuring the Performance of China’s 
Transforming Agriculture,” Journal of Productivity Analysis 33 (2010): 191–207.  
17
 Yao, Shujie and Zinan Liu, “Determinants of Grain Production and Technological Efficiency 
in China,” Journal of Agricultural Economics 49/2 (1998): 171–84. 
18
 Huang, Jikun and Scott Rozelle, “Technological Change: Rediscovering the Engine of 
Productivity Growth in China’s Rural Economy,” Journal of Development Economics 49/2 
(1996): 337–69; Lin, “An Economic Theory;” his “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth;” 
Fan, Shenggen, “Effects of Technological Change and Institutional Reform on Production 
Growth in Chinese Agriculture,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics  73 (1991): 266–
75. 
19
 For example, urban subsidy on grain, cotton and edible oil data stops at the year of 2006.  
deregulation (1998), and grain market liberalization (2004). We also notice that 
specific policies appeared in cluster (e.g. urban subsidies during 1990–3, grain 
procurement during 1995–7, and the grain bureau reforms during 1998–2003).  
Methodologically, we build a time series dataset of annual changes in grain 
output, food procurement price and the central government expenditure for 1979 
to 2006. We use the Granger causality method to see if the relationship between 
food output and government expenditure was causal. Moreover, we adopt an 
unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) approach to detect the link between 
food policies and food output. We also check whether the link we detect 
econometrically matches the historical reality. Our results show that food output 
in China was causally determined by government capacity to pay for food. 
Government policies enhanced farmers’ physical inputs in food production, as 
government monopsonic price was positively reflected in grain production in a 
lagged term. This was the endeavour to get the food price right.  
There was however a conflict between state monopsony and national food 
security. Each time food output peaked and hence increased national food supply, 
the increased procurement costs pushed policy–makers to tighten food price 
control and reverse the increased output which in turn put China’s food security 
in jeopardy, also part of the endeavour to get the food price right.  
This article is organised as follows: Section I provides an overview of the 
Chinese government dealing with food supply and food security. Section II is 
devoted to methodology and empirical results. Section III discusses rationales of 
government policies and their changes. Section IV simulates the central policy–
making procedure, and section V contains the final conclusions.  
 
II. Policy Determinants 
 
Due to the availability of data, our observations allow for 12 time series, six for 
grain production, five for fiscal conditions of the central government, and one for 
inflation. The time period chosen covers the years 1979 to 2006. The starting 
year marks the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. After 2006, China had 
undergone fully-fledged marketisation; the mission of the Gerschenkron state 
was accomplished.  
Most data for this research come from China’s Statistical Yearbooks and 
Finance Yearbooks of China. National statistics in post-Mao China are not 
perfect but serve as a “good enough” source of information regarding challenges 
and concerns faced by China’s decision-makers. The data extracted from these 
yearbooks include (1) a change rate of deflated (and hence real) expenditure of 
the central government 𝑒𝐺𝑡 , measured by nominal central government 
expenditure divided by inflation rate (consumer price index, hereafter CPI), (2) a 
change rate of grain output 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
, as a proxy of China’s national food security.20  
Our premise is that in a transition from the Soviet economy to a market 
economy, China’s Gerschenkron state needed a sizable budget to create 
semi-market incentives for the peasantry to produce more and better as well as to 
warrant the urban industrial class its basic needs. In this context, the government 
food procurement prices determined China’s grain production for the subsequent 
year, which in turn determined China’s national food security. Meanwhile, it is 
known that the food price offered by government grain procurement was subject 
to the government fiscal capacity. A Granger-causality test indeed shows the 
interrelation between the central government fiscal expenditure and the grain 
output from 1979 to 2006. Table 2 presents our results.
21
  
 
Table 2. Granger Causality Test between Central Government Fiscal Capacity and Grain Output, 
1979–2006 
Unit root test (Part One) Level (t-statistics) 
Variables    (1)    (2)   (3) 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 –5.4190 *** –5.3955 *** –5.0166 *** 
𝑒𝐺𝑡 –3.1390 ** –3.8819 ** –2.9279 *** 
Granger-causality test (Part Two)  
Null hypothesis Obs F-statistic P-value 
𝑒𝐺𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 27 10.1025 0.0040 *** 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 does not cause 𝑒𝐺𝑡  0.2386 0.6296  
 
Note: In the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, all three model specifications (1) with 
constant only, (2) with constant and time trend, and (3) with no constant or tend are included; the lag 
order is chosen, based on the Schwarz Criterion (SC); ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
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 In addition to grain output, we also run the same test against the change rate of rice output 𝑌𝑡
𝑟  in the 
Appendix A. Results show the same.  
21
 Detailed empirical model and testing results are presented in Appendix A.  
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Our results of unit root test imply that all variables are stationary at levels 
(Table 2, Part One); hence the Granger causality test for statistical significance of 
lagged level terms can be used. The causality test results are reported in Part Two 
of Table 2 where the computed F-statistics show that sequential unidirectional 
causality is significant. The p-value shows whether the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. The result from 𝑒𝐺𝑡 to 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 is significant. So, the Granger causality is 
unidirectional from the real central government expenditure to farmers’ grain 
production for the next production cycle.  
In reality, the Gerschenkron state had its limits. Every time food procurement 
pressure on the government budget became too high, China’s policy-makers 
opted for deregulation to avoid a fiscal crisis. In doing so, the government either 
procured less grain or offered a lower price, or did a bit of both. Changes in 
government procurement were communicated to the farmers, which in turn 
reduced China’s food output and national food security in the following year. The 
alarm was then raised by the watchdog the National Statistical Bureau and the 
government had to reverse its price policy. This is demonstrated by a government 
food policies chronicle from 1979 to 2006.  
Table 3 shows changes in food policies in three categories.
22
 Price control 
was the main concern from 1979 to 1988. It was replaced by urban food subsidies 
from 1989 to 1993, and then grain procurement fund and grain bureaus during 
1994 to 2003. Noticeably, each category coincided with a grain production cycle. 
Did these policy switches lead to changes in grain production?  
 
Table 3. Changes in Food Production, Food Security and Food Prices, 1979 –2006 
Year 
Production turning 
points (million tons) 
Average 
growth 
rate 
a
 Key changes Policy package 
1979–84 ↗ 407 (max, 1984) 5.1%  Increasing the “quota price” by 20% 
and the “above quota price” by 50% 
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 To show policy bias, we identify two types: fiscal policies and monopsony policies. Government 
monopsony is further specified in terms of pricing, subsidies, procurement fund and grain enterprise 
power. See Table A6 for detail.  
(1979) (P); facing budget deficits 
(1982) (F) 
1985–8 ↘ 379 (min, 1985) –0.7%  Reversing 30:70 ratio (1985) (P) Reducing 
prices 
1989–90 ↗ 446 (max, 1990) 6.5%  Reforming state procurement (1990) 
(M); increasing the grain rationing 
price (1991) (S); purchasing and 
selling at the same price (1992) (S) 
Reducing urban 
subsidies 
1991–3 → 435 (min, 1991) 0.8%  Allowing private traders to trade 
agricultural products (1993) (M); 
abolishing urban grain coupon system 
(1993) (S) 
Ending urban 
grain-rationing 
1994–8 ↗ 512 (max, 1998) 2.4%  Withholding accounts and suspending 
interests (1994) (F); reforming grain 
purchase fund  (1998) (G); reforming 
the Grain Bureau (1998) (G) 
Reforming 
procurement 
fund and the 
Grain Bureau 
1999–
2003 
↘ 430 (min, 2003) –3.3%  Liberalizing the grain trade (2003) 
(M) 
Ending 
monopsony 
2004–6 ↗ 498 (max, 2006) 5.0%  Withdrawing pricing rights from grain 
enterprises (2004) (G); abolishing the 
agricultural tax (2004–05) (M) 
Marketising the 
food sector 
 
Note: 
a 
Average growth rate of rice output is calculated as the average value of annual growth 
rate compared with the output level in the preceding year.  
Sources: See Tables A6 and A7.  
 
To test this interaction in food policies, we employ the unrestricted VAR 
model. Upon the policy changes shown in Table 3, three new variables are added 
for regressions: (1) government rice procurement price index, (2) urban subsidy 
index for cotton and edible oil and grain, and (3) government procurement fund 
index, all in real terms.
23
 The VAR testing aims to see if government 
monopsony-related policies individually or jointly caused grain production to 
change in order to establish a link between farmers’ producing behaviour seen 
from a change in physical inputs following the government policy swing. To 
further look into the impulse-leading-responses of China’s food production to 
                                                             
23
 Unfortunately, the data for the grain bureau deficits are available only from 1998 to 2006. We omit 
the data and instead use grain procurement fund for the test. 
shocks from each individual determinant, we use year-on-year change rates of 
variables (denoted as 𝑌𝑡
𝑔, 𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡, 𝑇𝑡, 𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡) as estimators in the model 
(see Appendix B for detail). All the variables are stationary at levels,  𝐼(0).24 
Empirical observations show that policies impacted on farmers’ production 
expectations for one to two years in the future.  
After minimising testing statistics, two-lag length is used on each variable to 
secure the whiteness of residuals. To do so, we run the regression without policy 
variables first to test input-led output changes only. The results are reported in 
Column 1 of Table 4. After three policy variables are introduced, the fitness of 
regression 𝑅2 increases from 0.52 to 0.86. It thus conforms that policy changes 
increased the significance of physical inputs (Table 4 Column 2 and Column 4).
25 
 
However, one of the health diagnostic checks on residual shows 
heteroskedasticity.
26
 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) is used to address this 
problem (Column 4 and Column 5). The results are significant at the five percent 
level or higher, derived either from the procurement price index (𝑒𝑃𝑡) or from the 
procurement fund (𝑒𝑅𝑡). Furthermore, we test the joint-causality of all three 
policy variables together. The results are significant at a 99 percent level 
(Columns 3 and 5).
27
  
In addition, the VAR test reveals a long-term equilibrium between China’s 
national grain output on the one hand and the government procurement 
price/fund in the preceding year on the other. Although the variable for urban 
food subsidies (𝑒𝑆𝑡) is not individually significant in either the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) or the WLS tests, 𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡 and 𝑒𝑅𝑡 jointly influence the grain 
output in the future one to two years with an above-95 percent level of 
                                                             
24
 See Appendix B for detail. 
25
 Intuitively, resource inputs such as fertilizer were insignificant for the long-run agricultural output. 
However, Fan Shenggen found that fertilizer was only an important input at early stages of China’s 
reforms before 1985; see Fan, “Technological Change.” Our testing result conforms this, i.e. when 
observations are extended to a longer period, the significance of fertilizer was critically reduced in grain 
production.  
26 
Our model passed ARCH heteroskedasticity check but not Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. To make sure 
the power of regression, we use the WLS to further correct the heteroskedasticity. See Appendix B for 
detail.  
27 
For diagnostic check of the system equation and regression residuals; see Appendix II for detail. 
significance. Empirically, this result is reasonable since urban food subsidy was 
most effective from 1979 to 1993.  
The Wald joint causality testing result further confirms the impact of policy 
changes (𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡 and 𝑒𝑅𝑡) shown in Table 4 (Columns 3 and 5).  
 
Table 4. Unrestricted VAR of Grain Output on Inputs and Policy Variables, 1979–2006 
 OLS WLS 
 
Grain 
output 
Grain 
output 
Grain output 
Wald test 
(Chi-square) 
    Grain 
    output 
Grain output 
Wald test 
(Chi-square) 
Variables    (1)    (2)  (3)        (4)   (5) 
Grain output (–1) (𝑌𝑡−1
𝑔
) –0.29 ( 1.01)  –1.22 (-3.82) ***   -1.21 (-6.50) ***   
Grain output (–2) (𝑌𝑡−2
𝑔
) 0.12 ( 0.43)  –0.70 (-1.82)    -0.70 (-3.10) **   
Labour (–1) (𝐿𝑡−1) 1.25 ( 1.42)  1.80 ( 2.36) **   1.80 ( 4.01) ***   
Labour (–2) (𝐿𝑡−2) –0.26 (-0.33)  –1.20 (-1.54)    -1.19 (-2.62) **   
Land (–1) (𝐾𝑡−1) –1.05 (-1.17)  –1.75 ( 2.42) **   -1.75 (-4.12) ***   
Land (–2) (𝐾𝑡−2) –2.61 (-2.34) ** –2.14 (-2.31) **   -2.14 (-3.92) ***   
Fertilizer (–1) (𝐹𝑡−1) 0.29 ( 0.81)  0.26 ( 0.87)    0.26 ( 1.47)    
Fertilizer (–2) (𝐹𝑡−2) –0.05 (-0.15)  0.18 ( 0.67)    0.18 ( 1.13)    
Machine(–1) (𝑇𝑡−1) –0.72 (-1.16)  –1.21 ( 1.94) *   -1.21 (-3.30) ***   
Machine (–2) (𝑇𝑡−2) –0.23 (-0.47)  –0.33 ( 0.63)    -0.33 (-1.06)    
Procurement price (–1) (𝑒𝑃𝑡−1)    –0.70 (-2.30) **   -0.70 (-3.91) ***   
Procurement price (–2) (𝑒𝑃𝑡−2)    –1.36 (-3.87) ***   -1.35 (-6.59) ***   
Urban subsidy (–1) (𝑒𝑆𝑡−1)    0.02 ( 0.18)    0.01 ( 0.30)    
Urban subsidy (–2) (𝑒𝑆𝑡−2)    –0.00 (-0.22)  22.21 *** -0.00 (-0.37)  64.17 *** 
Grain procurement fund (–1) (𝑒𝑅𝑡−1)    0.80 ( 2.91) **   0.80 ( 4.95) ***   
Grain procurement fund (–2) (𝑒𝑅𝑡−2)    1.24 ( 3.90) ***   1.24 ( 6.63) ***   
Constant 9.95 ( 2.17) ** 13.38 ( 2.70) **   13.38 ( 4.60) ***   
Observations 26   26     26     
R2 0.52   0.86     0.86     
Serial correlation a   0.90 [ 0.45]         
Heteroscedasticity b   0.23 [ 0.64]         
Normality c   0.38 [ 0.83]         
Stability d   Stable        
 
Notes: a Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test; b Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test; c Jacque-Bera 
normality test; d Cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) test; The t-statistics for variables are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Figure 3. Impulse Responses in the Production-Inputs-Policy VAR 
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Note: The shock corresponds to one standard deviation of the residual in each variable.  
 
Our impulse-responses’ results demonstrate the findings in VAR regression from 
the view of each individual variable (Figure 3). The unilateral changes in government 
grain procurement price and grain purchase fund caused long-run volatile fluctuations 
in food production. But response to changes in food subsidies was weak. Interestingly, 
in contrast to the regression result, food production returned quickly to equilibrium 
from shocks to non-policy variables, which indicates that China’s agricultural 
technology was advanced enough to cope with shocks to physical inputs for food 
production. Compared with physical inputs, food production in China was more 
sensitive to policy changes.  
What can be argued from the above empirical results is that output 
fluctuations in China’s food production were a result of the government food 
policy swings that were ultimately determined by the “visible hand” of the 
Gerschenkron state that aimed to guide the economy towards a simulated, price 
based market signal system. Eventually, the state trained the peasantry to read the 
price signals and at the same time weaned the urban consumers from generous 
food subsidies to allow them to face the market. In the end the “visible hand” 
withdrew, as intended.  
 
III. Changes in Policies and Food Production 
 
The causal relationship identified in Section II is further supported by evidence 
shown in Figure 4 where the policy curve (lower curve) shows (1) the 1979–88 
procurement price data, (2) the 1989–93 food subsidy data, (3) the 1994–7 rice 
budget data, (4) the 1998–2003 data for business loss of government grain 
bureaus, and (5) the 2004–6 price index data.28 Considering the lag in the 
empirical model, we move the policy curve one year to the right. Changes in food 
production mirror the trend of policy changes.  
 
Figure 4. Changes in Policies and Food Security, 1979–2006  
 
 
Note: 
a
 
b
 The rice procurement price index excludes the weight of the current year’s consumer 
price index.  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: 
China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2013); Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian (Finance 
Yearbook of China) (Beijing: China’s Finance Press, 1991–2013); National Bureau of Statistics, 
Zhongguo Jiage Tongji Nianjian (China Price Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 
1981–2013); Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian (China Agriculture Yearbook) (Beijing: 
China’s Agriculture Press, 1980–2013).  
 
Along the lower curve, the first round of reforms took place in 1979 to 1988 
to boost grain output with an increase in government “procurement quota pricing” 
(tonggou jia) and “above-quota bonus pricing” (chaogou jia) in order to nurture 
the market for the rural sector for the first time after China’s chronic food 
shortage under Mao’s collectivisation. In accordance with the 1979 Decisions of 
the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee (CCPCC), the government procurement price for grain increased 50–
80 percent. The peasantry responded. From 1979 to 1984, China enjoyed 
successive bumper harvests, with an annual growth rate of 5.1 percent.
 
The rice 
output increased 30.2 percent from the 1978 level, and wheat, 63.1 percent.   
                                                             
28
 Data for government grain bureau deficits are available only for 1997 to 2003.  
Such a rise in total food output in conjunction with higher procurement 
prices led to government’s fiscal difficulty. It is stated in Document No. 137 
issued in 1982 by the CCPCC that the sharp increase in the grain sales has 
exceeded the state’s fiscal capacity. This can only be understood in conjunction 
with China’s urban food subsidies which prevented the government from 
recouping its grain procurement costs. At that time, to deregulate urban food 
pricing seems to have been politically dangerous. The government’s only option 
was to reduce its procurement price for the peasantry. The new pricing policy 
was called the “reversed 30:70 ratio” (dao san qi) announced in 1985.29 The rice 
procurement price was cut by 6.9 percent in 1986. This unilateral change 
reversed the growth momentum in grain production: wheat output fell 10.3 
percent, and China’s aggregate grain output declined 0.7 percent in response to 
the new pricing. Clearly, the Chinese peasantry became market-price literate. 
Nevertheless, this drop threatened China’s national food security.  
To rescue food security, the government introduced stimuli.
30
 China’s grain 
production again responded. In 1990, the total outputs of rice and wheat reached 
their highest level since 1949. China’s total rice output in 1990 was 189.33 
million tonnes, 11.1 million tonnes higher than the previous peak in 1984 and 
about 40 percent higher than in 1978 when reforms began. China’s wheat output 
reached 98.2 million tonnes in 1990, an increase of over 80 percent from the 
level of 1978. The government had to buy in more food thanks to its food 
monopsony despite its unchanged urban monopolistic sale price of grain, which 
                                                             
29
 This means that 30 percent of the government procurement price was subject to a lowered 
baseline and 70 percent of government procurement price fetched a bonus price of 50 percent 
higher than the baseline price. Overall, the government procurement price increased 135 
percent from the 1984 level. The calculation is as follows:   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1985 = 30% ∙ 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1984 + 70% ∙ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1984   
             = 30% ∙ 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1984 + 70% ∙ (150% ∙ 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1984)   
             = 135% ∙ 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1984   
In CCPCC 1 (1985), the state also imposed a “protected price” (baohu jia) equal to the 
preceding year’s quota price. Such a price was  lower than the baseline price. The policy had a 
negative influence on farmers’ production incentives.  
30
 The policy linked production to the provision of subsidized chemical fertilizers ( pingjia 
huafei) and diesel oil for farming machines.   
meant an increasing budget burden for the state.
31
 As Figure 2 shows, the urban 
food subsidies amounted for 22.4 billion yuan, or a quarter of the central 
government average revenue of the time.  
This ushered in the second round of reforms in 1989 to 1993 (Table 3 and 
Figure 4). In 1991, the central government reduced urban food subsidies as a way 
to introduce the market to the urban consumers. A mere year later, a new “one 
price” policy, or “purchasing and selling grain at the same price” (gouxiao 
tongjia), was attempted to eradicate urban food subsidies completely. A new law 
was passed in 1993 to address this issue.
32
 The share of the urban food subsidies 
in central government budget spending soon plummeted from 23.5 percent in 
1993 to 7.0 percent in 1994.  
Soon after the grain deregulation, the urban grain price rose sharply,
33
 
jeopardising social stability in urban China. It forced the central government to 
resume monopsony over grain, leading to the third round of policy changes. 
Predictably, the grain monopsony returned, as too did the pressure on 
government finance. Then, in 1995 the State Council tightened the grain 
procurement budget.
34
 The central government also commissioned the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China to manage its grain procurement 
budget.
35
 But the government grain-cum-deficits kept increasing over the five 
consecutive years from 1994 to 1998 (Figure 4).
36
 According to State Council 
                                                             
31
 This is known as the “inversed urban-rural prices for grain” (chengxiang liangshi gouxiao 
jiage daogua), in which the rural procurement price was higher than the urban sale price.  
32
 See Chapter 4 “Agriculture Product Circulation” in the 1993 Agriculture Law. 
33
 Compared with the previous year, the 1993 and 1994 CPI increased by 14.7 percent and 24.1 percent, 
respectively. 
34
 In 1995, the State Council divided government grain bureaus’ duties into two parts – “commercial 
transactions” (jingying xing yewu) and “policy-based transactions” (zhengce xing yewu), and made clear 
that commercial transactions should not use grain procurement budgets.  
35
 According to the grain budget management rules established by Ministry of Finance 139 (1996), all 
“special funds for purchasing grain” (gouliang zhuankuan) must be jointly managed by the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China and the State Ministry of Finance. 
36
 According to Liu et al (2004), the grain-cum-deficits in the grain bureaus had rapidly increased to 
120 billion yuan by 1998, or 100 million yuan per day; see Liu, Bin, Zhaogang Zhang and Gong Huo, 
Zhongguo Sannong Wenti Baogao (Report on China’s Farming, Countryside and Peasantry 
Issues) (Beijing: China’s Development Press, 2004). 
Document No.15 (1998), the cost of grain overwhelmed the government 
finance.
37
  
Against this backdrop, a new round of reforms were kick started.
38
 From 
1998, as part of the marketisation reforms the state-owned grain bureaus were 
made financially independent.
39
 Meanwhile, the State Council’s Decree No. 244 
(1998) imposed a new principle of “selling grain at a favourable price” (shunjia 
xiaoshou) to recoup the monopsonic procurement cost. This could only mean a 
price drop in government procurement prices for farmers. It ushered in China’s 
largest trough in food output from 1999 until 2003, which forced the central 
policy-maker to abandon grain monopsony after 2004.  
In a nutshell, in the process of re-establishing the market for agriculture, a 
high government procurement price warranted more food output and hence better 
food security; and a low food price helped the urban consumers with their living 
standards. The Gerschenkron state had to strike a balance between the two 
sectors and gradually introduced the market to both sectors. The state gradually 
and successfully exited from the food market. Figure 5 illustrates the general 
trend.  
 
Figure 5. Reduction of Government Involvement to Give Way to the Market  
                                                             
37
 The major focus of the State Council of People’s Republic of China Document No. 15 (1998) 
(hereafter SCPRC 15 (1998)) was on how to control grain bureaus’ deficits. For the first time the state 
asked all grain bureaus to conduct independent accounting. The central finance was no longer willing to 
pay the deficits. SCPRC 15 (1998).  
38
 First, in 1997 the state announced a new guideline for grain bureaus as “cost plus slim profit” 
(baoben weili). This principle signalled that the government selling price should bring back a profit. 
39
  SCPRC 15 (1998) separated grain procurement and storage enterprises from grain bureaus to better 
control deficits. SCPRC 15 (1998).  
Source: The same as Figure 2. 
 
IV. Conceptual Framework for Policy Choices 
 
To understand the policy-maker’s choices, firstly, we assume that farmers always 
respond to the price signal regardless of whether it is a market price or 
government monopsonic price, and hence:  
 
𝑌 = 𝑌(𝑃), 
 
Where 𝑌 is positively related to the price level, i.e. 𝑌′(𝑃) > 0.  
Secondly, the leading price is the state monopsonic price  𝑃𝑠, determined by 
the central government’s fiscal affordability:  
 
𝑃𝑠 = 𝑃𝑒 + 𝑃𝑔. 
 
Where 𝑃𝑒  represents the market equilibrium price; and 𝑃𝑔 is the overpriced 
portion caused by the government output-promotion monopsonic price during the 
period when food shortage looms large. Both 𝑃𝑒 and 𝑃𝑠 satisfy 𝑃𝑒 > 0, 𝑃𝑠 > 0. 
When the government procurement price is not the same as the equilibrium level, 
𝑃𝑠 ≠ 𝑃𝑒 , 𝑃𝑔 ≠ 0, the market clearance level under the government influence 
becomes 𝑌𝑠 = 𝑌(𝑃𝑒 + 𝑃𝑔), where 𝑌𝑠 differs from the market equilibrium level 𝑌𝑒, 
which is free from government influence.  
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Figure 6 presents the situation when the grain economy is under strict state 
monopsony. In order to keep the market at clearance levels,  the government has 
to pay for the difference between the urban subsidised price 𝑃𝑑  and the 
monopsonic price 𝑃𝑠. The distortion of the market can be measured by the grain 
output 𝑌𝑠 at a market clearance price 𝑃𝑑. The total grain subsidies equal to 𝑠𝑌𝑠 
(𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑑𝑃𝑠 ), in which the rate of subsidies 𝑠  is the difference between the 
procurement price and the market clearance price, i.e. 𝑠 = 𝑃𝑠 − 𝑃𝑑.  
 
Figure 6. Grain Production under State Monopsony 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the viewpoint of the central government operation, the total 
expenditure on grain  𝐺 is confined within the limit of 𝐺 ≤ ?̅?. More specifically, 
𝐺 is determined by (1) the grain procurement cost (known also as the “grain 
procurement fund”)  𝑅 =  𝑟𝑃𝑠𝑌 , where 𝑟  denotes the interest rate in grain 
purchasing; (2) the urban price subsidies  𝑠𝑌𝑠 , and (3) the monopsony 
management cost 𝑀(𝑌) = 𝑚𝑌. The government expenditure on grain can be 
presented as:  
 
𝐺 = 𝑅 + 𝑠𝑌 +𝑀.  
 
By the same token, to simulate central policy-making on food security, we 
assume that policy-makers have to solve a utility function with budget constraint:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈 = {𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐺,𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌}, subjected to 𝐺 ≤ ?̅?.  
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The causality between government fiscal capacity and food production can 
be shown in two scenarios (see Appendix A). Scenario 1: fiscal expenditure does 
not cause output if 𝐺 is not capped. When ?̅? is removed from decision-making, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌 is no longer constrained. Then, policy-makers’ target is simplified to solve 
a utility function with a minimal expenditure on grain:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐺 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑟𝑃𝑌 + 𝑠𝑌 +𝑚𝑌}.  
 
Here, when the government fiscal capacity can afford all grain monopsony costs 
and at the same time delivers the desirable total output 𝑌 at any level, the 
government policy is simplified to the point of an increase in efficiency of the 
grain procurement fund and grain bureaus by reducing 𝑟 and 𝑚, because, in 
reality, both 𝑟 and 𝑚 are irrelevant to grain output, only dependent on the 
governance quality of the grain regulator.  
Moreover, when the total output is given exogenous   𝑌 = 𝑌𝑠, the difference 
between the grain procurement price and the market clearance price 𝑠 is also 
exogenous, as 𝑠 = 𝑃(𝑌𝑠) − 𝑃𝑑. The central government has no impact on 𝑌; and 
there is no causality from the central fiscal expenditure to food production when 
𝐺 is not capped:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐺(𝑟,𝑚). 
 
Scenario 2: fiscal expenditure causes output if it has an upper limit  𝐺 ≤ ?̅?. If 
the grain procurement fund 𝑅 =  𝑟𝑃𝑌 and administrative cost of monopsony 
  𝑀(𝑌) = 𝑚𝑌  both satisfy  𝑅′′ > 0  and  𝑀′′ > 0 , then  𝐺′′(𝑌) > 0.  Further, we 
assume central government’s fiscal preference is linear or quasi -linear on 
increasing marginal cost, which means that the marginal grain output does not 
cause extra utility to the central government. Then we have:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈 = {𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐺(𝑌),𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌}, where  𝐺′′(𝑌) > 0 and  𝐺 ≤ ?̅?. 
 
This means any increase in output potential, such as technical progress and 
demand changes, will increase government expenditure. If the central 
government grain expenditure is bound to a fiscal capacity which is insufficient 
to fund grain monopsony, to maintain its overall utility the central government 
either depresses output 𝑌,  or reduces subsidy 𝑠 and abandons 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐺(𝑠, 𝑃), where 𝐺′′(𝑌) > 0 and 𝐺 ≤ ?̅?. 
 
As there exists a long-run unidirectional causal relationship from the central 
fiscal expenditure to the grain production (see Section II), it is reasonable to 
believe that China’s food policy-making resembles Scenario 2. This de facto 
causality corroborates upper bounds ?̅? in the central government’s fiscal load 
on grain monopsony to limit policy-maker’s decision making, 𝐺 ≤ ?̅? 
(Proposition 1). Also, with the monopsony of grain, all government food policies 
eventually take effect through affecting the final grain output and supply  𝑌𝑠 
(Proposition 2).  
This framework captures the mechanisms of changes in policies and food 
output. Amongst all three major reasons for fiscal crises, grain procurement 
reforms are linked to procurement prices  𝑃𝑠 , urban subsidies  𝑠𝑌 , grain 
procurement fund 𝑟𝑃𝑌 and the power of grain bureaus 𝑚(𝑌). This framework 
also explains why government policy reforms were not random but dictated by 
costs incurred by some specific choices.  
Figure 7 demonstrates the mechanisms of changes. The policy-makers 
increased urban food price (1991) from 𝑃𝑑 to 𝑃𝑑
′ . They then employed “one price 
for food” (1992), which reduced the rural procurement price 𝑃𝑠 to 𝑃𝑠
′. Both choices 
reduced the grain market clearance level. The result of capping grain subsidies 
capped grain output as well: when subsidies were narrowed from  𝐴𝐵𝑃𝑑𝑃𝑠 
to  𝐴′𝐵′𝑃𝑑
′𝑃𝑠
′ , grain output declined from 𝑌𝑠  to  𝑌𝑠
′ . But the urban selling price 
increased to  𝑃𝑑
′  with contractions in consumer’s surplus and producer’s 
surplus 𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑑
′𝑃𝑑 and 𝐴𝐴
′𝑃𝑠
′𝑃𝑠, respectively. The urban sector was finally ready 
for a full market price for food without hardships (the early 1990s,). The urban 
food subsidies were swiftly abandoned as a result. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ending of Food Subsidies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the abolition of the urban subsidy, the fiscal pressure was so greatly 
eased that the government had the resources to increase grain procurement funds 
and invest in grain bureaus. But when grain output reached historical heights in 
the mid-1990s, pressure on the government budget rocketed. At this point, the 
government expenditure function became  𝐺 = 𝑟𝑃𝑌 +𝑚𝑌, retaining only the grain 
procurement fund and cost of grain bureaus.  
 
Figure 8. Grain Bureau Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 demonstrates a welfare loss to both the urban consumers and the 
rural producer due to grain bureaus’ arbitrage. With arbitrage, urban grain price 
leaps to 𝑃𝑑
′′ plus a depressed grain procurement price  𝑃𝑠
′′. Grain bureaus make 
profit 𝐴′′𝐵′′𝑃𝑑
′′𝑃𝑠
′′ , which comes from the consumer’s surplus and producer’s 
surplus. Meanwhile, the grain output drops to  𝑌𝑠
′′ . A part of social welfare 
𝐴′𝐸𝐵′𝐶𝐷 becomes the deadweight loss. This policy was not efficient during the 
1994-2003 reforms. In 2003 the government terminated state grain monopsony 
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and arbitrage. The government-free market finally returned to China’s food 
sector.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
By establishing the causality from government fiscal capacity in Beijing to grain 
production in villages, this article reveals the mechanisms in which a 
“Gerschenkron state” acted as a proxy for the market by creating and sending the 
peasantry artificial price signals under a state monopsony on behalf of the 
demand side to generate food output from the supply side composed of more or 
less autonomous producers for a market. 
In particular, China’s Gerschenkronian policies aimed to re-establish the 
market economy for food after 1979. But there was no market economy yet. The 
Gerschenkronian prices (either government procurement prices for the rural 
sector or government subsidised prices for the urban sector) served as a learning 
process for the economy to get used to resource allocation in a non-planned 
economy; a step towards revival of the market that was eliminated by the state 
after 1949. The challenge to the reformist state was how to get food prices right 
so that enough food was produced by the peasantry during the first stage of the 
post-Mao reforms when a functional market was long absent due to the Soviet 
system adopted by Maoist China.  
The Gerschenkronian price signals were received positively by the rural 
producers. High procurement prices encouraged food supply in the next food 
production cycle and hence improved China’s food security. But a low food price 
suited the urban sector that lived on government subsidies. The result was dual 
prices for the same food. The price gap had to be bridged by government fiscal 
capacity.  
This nurturing and tutoring of the market by the state was largely a process 
of trial and error which in turn determined inevitable frequent changes to get the 
food prices “right” (meaning that the food market clears itself). Operationally, 
the state food monopsony caused policy swings, sometimes on a massive scale. 
Meanwhile, the new price-responsive food outputs fluctuated accordingly, which 
sometimes threatened China’s food security in the short run.  
Even so, the purpose was clear: to strike a balance between government grain 
procurement for the rural producers and affordable food for urban residents. In 
the end, the Gerschenkron state did succeed in getting the prices right; China’s 
agriculture was successfully marketised. This is shown in Figure 9: After 1998, 
the government procurement price for rice was the same as the market price; and 
the urban food retail price was practically identical with the market price for rice 
as well. The “Gerschenkron mission” was accomplished.  
 
Figure 9. Food Price Conversion during the Reforms 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Data, <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/>, 
accessed 29 January 2016; National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China 
Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2007). 
 
Our findings also show that for China’s food production physical inputs were 
necessary but not the only sufficient factors. Institutions and policies played a 
significant role. This point differs from the traditional view on China’s 
post-reform agricultural performance. State intervention and monopsony helped 
government achieve reform goals, but the Gerschenkron state had to struggle 
with its fiscal limits. Even so, in the end, the state did get the price right for food 
on behalf of the market, an important deed that we should not underestimate or 
take for granted.  
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Appendix A 
 
Causal Relationship between Government Fiscal Capacity and Food Production 
 
This appendix aims to establish a long-run causal relationship between the central 
government fiscal ability and food production by focusing on four time series, namely, 
the national grain output, the national rice output, government fiscal expenditure, and 
the inflation rate.  
 
1. Data Description and Model Specification 
 
Yearly data for the four time series come from Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China’s 
Statistical Yearbooks), Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian (Finance Yearbooks of China), 
and Zhongguo Jiage Tongji Nianjian (China’s Price Statistical Yearbooks). Our 
observation period is set from 1979 to 2006, covering the whole transition from 
monopsony to the government-free market. Variables and data used in the test are 
denoted as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
: Change rate of grain output 
𝑌𝑡
𝑟: Change rate of rice output 
𝐺𝑡: Change rate of central government expenditure index 
𝑒𝐺𝑡: Change rate of real (deflated) central government expenditure index  
 
We use the year-on-year change rate of central government expenditure 𝐺𝑡 to 
denote the state’s fiscal capacity. We also include the deflated term 𝑒𝐺𝑡 measured by 
nominal central expenditure divided by the inflation rate.  
Food security is measured by the change rate of food output 𝑌𝑡
𝑘. We mainly use 
grain output data 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 for estimation, which according to China’s Statistical Yearbooks, 
grain output includes cereals, potato and beans. However, food security usually refers 
to cereals of which rice is always very important for China. Thus rice output 𝑌𝑡
𝑟 is 
also taken as a reliable proxy for food output. By examining grain and rice we are 
more likely to establish an unbiased relationship between Chinese government fiscal 
capacity and the country’s food security.  
For the simple fact that the actual causal relationship between government fiscal 
capacity and food security is unknown prior to reforming China, we begin our 
empirical analysis by specifying two bivariate regression equations.  
 
𝑒𝐺𝑡 = 𝜑10 + 𝜑11𝑌𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀1𝑡   (A − 1) 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑘 = 𝜑20 + 𝜑21𝑒𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡     (A − 2) 
 
In the above long-run regression functions, 𝐺𝑡 is the year-on-year percentage change 
in the government fiscal capacity, 𝑌𝑡
𝑘  is the food output growth rate, and 𝜑𝑘𝑖 
denotes the associated regression coefficients. In detecting the asymmetric 
interrelations between the observed time series variables, we employ the Granger 
causality method which requires information on the past growth rate of both 
variables.
40
 This can be represented by the following equation:  
 
(
𝑒𝐺𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑘 ) = 𝑐 +
{
 
 
 
 
∑ 𝛼1𝑚𝑒𝐺𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽1𝑚𝑌𝑡−𝑚
𝑘
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡
∑ 𝛼2𝑚𝑌𝑡−𝑚
𝑘
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽2𝑚𝑒𝐺𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡
                     (A − 3) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑘𝑚 denotes the coefficients of lagged term of dependent variables and 𝛽𝑘𝑚 
for the independent variables.  
The meaning of the above system equation is stated as follows: 𝑒𝐺𝑡 (𝑌𝑡
𝑘) is 
expected to Granger-cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑘  (𝑒𝐺𝑡), if  𝑌𝑡
𝑘  (𝑒𝐺𝑡) can be better predicted by the 
histories of both 𝑌𝑡
𝑘 and 𝑒𝐺𝑡 than that of 𝑌𝑡
𝑘  (𝑒𝐺𝑡) alone. The 𝐹-tests are applied on 
the null hypotheses of Granger non-causality, H0: 𝛽𝑘𝑚 = 0 . If the computed 
𝐹-statistics surpass the upper bound critical values, one rejects the null hypothesis of 
Granger non-causality and a causal relationship between government fiscal capacity 
and food production exists, and vice versa.  
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 Because the testing of the Granger causality involves time series data, the 
presence of any stochastic trend must be tested. In this paper we follow the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression to test the unit root hypothesis:  
 
(
∆𝑒𝐺𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡
𝑘 ) = 𝑐 +
{
 
 
 
 
𝜌1𝑇𝑅 + 𝛾1𝑒𝐺𝑡−1 +∑𝜃1𝑖∆𝑒𝐺𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
+𝑒1𝑡
𝜌2𝑇𝑅 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑡−1
𝑘 +∑𝜃2𝑖∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑞
𝑖=1
+𝑒2𝑡
                  (A − 4) 
 
Where 𝑇𝑅 stands for the time trend. The unit root test is then carried out under the 
null hypothesis H0: 𝛾𝑘 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis H1: 𝛾𝑘 < 0. The results 
of the ADF test indicate that if  𝛾𝑘 is greater than the critical value, then the time 
series for 𝑒𝐺𝑡 or 𝑌𝑡 are not stationary. In order to achieve a better test result, all three 
models with (1) constant 𝑐 only, (2) with constant 𝑐 and time trend 𝑇𝑅, and (3) with 
no constant or trend are included in the next part of testing specification. The 
appropriate lag length is chosen based on the rule of Schwarz criterion (SC).  
 
2. Granger Causality Test  
 
The ADF unit root tests perform with three models for all the series. The results of 
tests for (A − 4) listed in Table A1 are in favour of the level of the data; and the unit 
root null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level and above. Thus, our four time 
series are all stationary at level with 95 percent level of confidence.  
 
Table A1. Results of ADF unit root tests 
 Variables 𝐼(0) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
  –5.4190 *** –5.3955 *** –5.0166 *** 
 𝑌𝑡
𝑟  –4.8945 *** –5.0372 *** –4.8166 *** 
𝐺𝑡 –3.6336 ** –4.2956 ** –2.3982 ** 
   𝑒𝐺𝑡 –3.1390 ** –3.8819 ** –2.9279 *** 
 
Note: All three models with (1) constant only, (2) with constant and time trend, and (3) with no constant 
or trend are included in the model specification; the lag order is chosen based on the rule of SC, 5 lag 
lengths for all four series; *** indicates 1 percent significance level; and ** indicates 5 percent 
significance level.  
 
The selection of lag order of variables included in the (A − 4) test equation 
follows with SC rule, which implies that farmer’s production incentives are based on 
their knowledge of previous year’s government procurement price and quantity. The 
results of ADF unit root tests indicate that the Granger causality test for the statistical 
significance of lagged level terms in (A − 3)  can reveal the long-run causal 
relationship between government fiscal capacity and food security.  
The results of the Granger causality tests for (A − 3) are reported in Table A2, 
where the computed 𝐹 -statistics of H0: 𝛽𝑘𝑚 = 0  demonstrate significant 
unidirectional non-causality from the former to the latter variables. The 𝑝-value 
indicates the level of significance of the null hypothesis.  
 
Table A2. Results of Granger Causality Tests  
Null hypothesis Obs F-statistic p-value 
Result of Granger causality test ( 𝑌𝑡
𝑔 , 𝐺𝑡) 
𝐺𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 27 6.03998 0.0216 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔 does not cause 𝐺𝑡  0.36452 0.5517 
Result of Granger causality test ( 𝑌𝑡
𝑔 , 𝑒𝐺𝑡) 
𝑒𝐺𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 27 10.1025 0.0040 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 does not cause 𝑒𝐺𝑡  0.23862 0.6296 
Result of Granger causality test ( 𝑌𝑡
𝑟 , 𝐺𝑡) 
𝐺𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑟  27 5.20024 0.0318 
𝑌𝑡
𝑟  does not cause 𝐺𝑡  0.01838 0.8933 
Result of Granger causality test ( 𝑌𝑡
𝑟 , 𝑒𝐺𝑡) 
𝑒𝐺𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡
𝑟  27 9.41964 0.0053 
𝑌𝑡
𝑟  does not cause 𝑒𝐺𝑡  0.16961 0.6841 
 
The testing results of 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑒𝐺𝑡 to 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
, 𝑌𝑡
𝑟 are all significant at the five percent 
level above. As the empirical tests suggest, the Granger causality test indicates a 
long-run stable causal relationship from government fiscal capacity to the national 
food security during the period in question.  
Moreover, all four test results demonstrate that the causality is unidirectional from 
real/nominal central government expenditure to grain/rice output. This relationship is 
also significant from the real central government expenditure to the next year’s rice 
output. This makes sense as rice was under more restrict control than other foods by 
the state. This is the reason why Section III focuses on rice-related policies.  
The results also confirm that there is no causality from food production to 
government expenditures, which means that farmers had no influence on government 
fiscal capacity. We also argue that reforms were generated within the government 
sector due to the costs of policies: high cost policies gave way to low cost ones.  
The results in Appendix A show a long-run unidirectional causal relationship from 
the state’s fiscal capacity to grain production in China. The current year’s government 
food expenditure directly determined the future grain output. The test results are 
particularly significant for real government fiscal capacity and food production. In 
Appendix B and Section III, we will discuss the mechanism through which this 
causality functions.  
  
Appendix B  
 
Joint-Causality and Impulse-Response Analysis in the Production-Input-Policy 
Unrestricted VAR  
 
To take our investigation further, the unrestricted VAR model is chosen here to 
detect long-run association between different categories of food policies and food 
production. To achieve that, we follow the results of Table 3 and add three additional 
policy variables to basic physical inputs into our analysis: (1) grain procurement price 
index, (2) grain, cotton and edible oil subsidies for the urban sector, and (3) grain 
procurement fund index.  
 
1. Data Description and Model Specification  
 
Our annual data come from Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China’s Statistical 
Yearbooks), Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian (Finance Yearbooks of China), and 
Zhongguo Jiage Tongji Nianjian (China’s Price Statistical Yearbooks). Our sample 
period is again set from 1979 to 2006. All variables are listed as below:
41
  
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
: Change rate of grain output  
𝐿𝑡: Change rate of labour in farming, forestry and animal husbandry  
𝐾𝑡: Change rate of effective irrigated area  
𝐹𝑡: Change rate of chemical fertilizers  
𝑇𝑡: Change rate of power of machinery  
𝑒𝑃𝑡: Change rate of real procurement price index (excludes CPI)  
𝑒𝑆𝑡: Change rate of real urban subsidies on grain, cotton and edible oil index 
(excludes CPI)  
𝑒𝑅𝑡: Change rate of real procurement fund index (excludes CPI)  
 
Following the finding of Appendix A, for our purpose we only establish the 
equation of 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 as a dependent variable in this appendix to look into the interrelations 
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 Procurement price index and grain procurement fund index are calculated from the rice data which 
are most detailed.  
between the government food policies and food security for reforming China. We 
begin our empirical analysis with the following production functions:  
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑁𝑃) (B − 1) 
 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑁𝑃, 𝑃𝑂𝐿)  (B − 2) 
 
Where 𝐼𝑁𝑃 stands for physical inputs (𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡, 𝑇𝑡) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿 for policy variables 
(𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡). (B − 1) describes the traditional production function based on major 
physical inputs, while (B − 2) includes our analysis of policy impact on China’s food 
production. Accordingly, our long-run equilibrium regression functions between 𝑌 
and 𝐼𝑁𝑃, 𝑃𝑂𝐿 can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝐿𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐾𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑5𝑇𝑡 + 𝑒1𝑡      (B − 3) 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝐿𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐾𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐹𝑡 + 𝜑5𝑇𝑡 + 𝜑6𝑒𝑃𝑡 + 𝜑7𝑒𝑆𝑡 + 𝜑8𝑒𝑅𝑡 + 𝑒2𝑡    
(B − 4) 
 
In the above long-run regression functions, 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 is the year-on-year percentage 
change in food output, 𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡, 𝑇𝑡  denotes the change rates of physical inputs, 
𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡 for policy changes. The parameters 𝜑𝑘𝑖 denote the associated regression 
coefficients of above independent variables. In detecting the interrelations between the 
observed time series variables, we employ the unrestricted VAR which requires 
information on the past growth rate of all variables. This can be represented by the 
following equation (B − 5):  
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
= 𝑐 +
{
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝛼1𝑚𝑌𝑡−𝑚
𝑔
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽11𝑚𝐿𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽12𝑚𝐾𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽13𝑚𝐹𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽14𝑚𝑇𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡
∑𝛼2𝑚𝑌𝑡−𝑚
𝑔
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽21𝑚𝐿𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽22𝑚𝐾𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛽23𝑚𝐹𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽24𝑚𝑇𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+∑ 𝛾21𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛾22𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛾23𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑡−𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡
      (B − 5) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑘𝑚 denotes the coefficients of lagged term of dependent variables and 𝛽𝑘𝑚 
for the independent physical input variables and 𝛾𝑘𝑚 for independent policy variables. 
The meaning of such a system equation can be stated as: 𝑒𝑃𝑡 , 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡 is expected to 
individually and/or jointly impact on 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
, if  𝑌𝑡
𝑔 can be better predicted by the histories 
of physical inputs and policy variables than that of physical inputs alone. The 
𝑡-statistics are applied to test the significance of individual variables, and χ2 are 
applied on the null hypotheses of joint non-causality, H0: 𝛾𝑘𝑚 = 0. If the computed 
statistics surpass the upper bound critical values, we then reject the null hypothesis and 
a joint causal relationship between policy swings and food production exists, and vice 
versa.  
 In addition, we use the impulse-response analysis to identify the responsiveness of 
food production 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 in the VAR when a shock is put to the error term. This is noted as 
the following VAR system:  
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑔 + 𝜃𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒3𝑡                                  (B − 6) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑡  denotes both 𝐼𝑁𝑃  ( 𝑌𝑡
𝑔, 𝐿𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡 ) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿  ( 𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡 ). The 
parameter 𝛼𝑖 indicates the coefficients of the lagged term of 𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑔
 and 𝜃𝑖  for all 
inputs. Impulse-response equation (B − 6) implies a change in the residual 𝑒3𝑡 will 
bring a change in 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
, and also causes a change in both 𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑋𝑡 during the 
subsequent periods. With a shock to the residual in (B − 6), this test will allow us to 
understand further how it affects the whole VAR system (B − 4). In reality it reveals 
individual physical input and policy variable’s impact to food production in China.  
Due to the testing of the unrestricted VAR involving time series data, we firstly 
test the presence of any stochastic trend. In this appendix we again follow the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression to test the unit root hypothesis:  
∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜌𝑇𝑅 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 +∑𝜃𝑖∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
+ 𝑒4𝑡                          (B − 7) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑡 denotes both 𝐼𝑁𝑃 (𝑌𝑡
𝑔, 𝐿𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿 (𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡); 𝑇𝑅 stands 
for the time trend. The unit root test is then carried out under the null hypothesis 
H0: 𝛾 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis of H1: 𝛾 < 0. The results of the ADF test 
indicate that if calculated statistics of 𝛾 is greater than the critical value, the time 
series for 𝑋𝑡 are not stationary. We include constant 𝑐 and time trend 𝑇𝑅 in all 
models with (1), and then exclude constant or tend in (2) in the tests. The appropriate 
lag length is chosen based on the rule of SC.  
 
2. Unrestricted VAR and Impulse-Response Analysis 
 
Our empirical analysis in Table 3 shows that the state’s food policies are highly 
associated with the level of food security in China, and that various food policies may 
have individually and/or jointly affected output. Our VAR on associationship between 
specific food policies and grain output from 1979 to 2006 shows the possibility of little 
to less influence of individual food policies on food production if they were temporary 
measures. A Wald test is therefore employed to see if all these specific policies jointly 
as a package cause the long-run grain production to change.  
Change rates of variables (𝑌𝑡
𝑔, 𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐹𝑡, 𝑇𝑡, 𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡, 𝑒𝑅𝑡) are used as estimators in 
the unrestricted VAR model; and all of them are stationary at levels in ADF unit root 
test (Table B1).
42
  
 
Table B1. ADF Unit Root Test  
  𝐼(0) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
𝑌𝑡
𝑔
 -5.3955 *** -5.0166 *** 
𝐿𝑡 -4.6411 *** -2.3735 ** 
 𝐾𝑡 -3.7394 ** -2.8248 *** 
𝐹𝑡 -4.8723 *** -2.7877 *** 
𝑇𝑡 -3.5701 * -2.6017 ** 
𝑒𝑃𝑡  -4.9062 *** -5.1806 *** 
𝑒𝑆𝑡  -13.8175 *** -15.776 *** 
𝑒𝑅𝑡 -5.2562 *** -5.4600 *** 
 
Note: We test two models with (i) with constant and trend, and (ii) with no constant or trend in the 
model specification; the optimal lag lengths are chosen based on the rule of Schwartz criterion (SC); 
***, ** and * indicates 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 
Following the rule of Akaike information criterion (AIC), we choose two leg 
lengths for the VAR system in (B − 5). We first run the regression without policy 
variables to test input-led output changes. Our results are reported in Column (1), 
Table B2. Secondly, we include three policy variables to the VAR model and run the 
tests respectively with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Weighted Least Square 
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 𝐿𝑡 has a unit root at level in the model with a constant, but is still stationary at level with a 99% 
confidence interval for the other two models. We consider this variable stationary at level. 
(WLS).
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 Our results are listed in Columns (2) and (4) of Table B2. Column (4) of 
Table B2 contains the results of WLS in VAR. The new test results support our 
conclusion with an enhanced level of significance to most variables. Finally we test the 
joint-causality of policy variables with the results of OLS and WLS, respectively. The 
results are reported in Columns (3) and (5) of Tables B2 (the same as Table 4).  
 
Table B2. Unrestricted VAR of Grain Output on Inputs and Policy Variables, 1979–2006  
 OLS WLS 
 
Grain 
output 
Grain 
output 
Grain output 
Wald test 
(Chi-square) 
Grain  
 output 
Grain output 
Wald test 
(Chi-square) 
Variables    (1)    (2)  (3)        (4)   (5) 
Grain output (–1) (𝑌𝑡−1
𝑔
) –0.29 ( 1.01)  –1.22 (-3.82) ***   -1.21 (-6.50) ***   
Grain output (–2) (𝑌𝑡−2
𝑔
) 0.12 ( 0.43)  –0.70 (-1.82)    -0.70 (-3.10) **   
Labour (–1) (𝐿𝑡−1) 1.25 ( 1.42)  1.80 ( 2.36) **   1.80 ( 4.01) ***   
Labour (–2) (𝐿𝑡−2) –0.26 (-0.33)  –1.20 (-1.54)    -1.19 (-2.62) **   
Land (–1) (𝐾𝑡−1) –1.05 (-1.17)  –1.75 ( 2.42) **   -1.75 (-4.12) ***   
Land (–2) (𝐾𝑡−2) –2.61 (-2.34) ** –2.14 (-2.31) **   -2.14 (-3.92) ***   
Fertilizer (–1) (𝐹𝑡−1) 0.29 ( 0.81)  0.26 ( 0.87)    0.26 ( 1.47)    
Fertilizer (–2) (𝐹𝑡−2) –0.05 (-0.15)  0.18 ( 0.67)    0.18 ( 1.13)    
Machine(–1) (𝑇𝑡−1) –0.72 (-1.16)  –1.21 ( 1.94) *   -1.21 (-3.30) ***   
Machine (–2) (𝑇𝑡−2) –0.23 (-0.47)  –0.33 ( 0.63)    -0.33 (-1.06)    
Procurement price (–1) (𝑒𝑃𝑡−1)    –0.70 (-2.30) **   -0.70 (-3.91) ***   
Procurement price (–2) (𝑒𝑃𝑡−2)    –1.36 (-3.87) ***   -1.35 (-6.59) ***   
Urban subsidy (–1) (𝑒𝑆𝑡−1)    0.02 ( 0.18)    0.01 ( 0.30)    
Urban subsidy (–2) (𝑒𝑆𝑡−2)    –0.00 (-0.22)  22.21 *** -0.00 (-0.37)  64.17 *** 
Grain procurement fund (–1) (𝑒𝑅𝑡−1)    0.80 ( 2.91) **   0.80 ( 4.95) ***   
Grain procurement fund (–2) (𝑒𝑅𝑡−2)    1.24 ( 3.90) ***   1.24 ( 6.63) ***   
Constant 9.95 ( 2.17) ** 13.38 ( 2.70) **   13.38 ( 4.60) ***   
Observations 26   26     26     
R2 0.52   0.86     0.86     
Serial correlation a   0.90 [ 0.45]         
Heteroscedasticity b   0.23 [ 0.64]         
Normality c   0.38 [ 0.83]         
Stability d   Stable        
 
Notes: a Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test; b Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test; c Jacque-Bera 
normality test; d Cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) test; The t-statistics for variables are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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 The reason for the use of WLS is because the diagnostic check of residuals based on system equation 
(B − 5) passes all diagnostic checks, but Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity shows 
significant at 1 percent. To make sure of the power of our regression, we use the WLS to further correct 
the heteroskedasticity. After correction, our model is healthy and we can accept the findings derived 
from this model. 
 After the introduction of three policy variables, the fitness of regression R
2
 
increases from 0.52 to 0.86, conforming that when policy changed the significance of 
physical inputs in food production enhanced in the long run.
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 So, food policies 
remain persuasive in explaining changes in grain production.  
The results of 𝑒𝑃𝑡 and 𝑒𝑅𝑡 are significant, at the five percent level or higher. The 
VAR test indicates that there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between food 
production and the grain procurement price and grain procurement fund in the 
preceding year. Although urban subsidy 𝑒𝑆𝑡 is not individually significant, 𝑒𝑃𝑡, 𝑒𝑆𝑡 
and 𝑒𝑅𝑡  jointly influence the future grain output with an enhanced confidence 
interval at 99 percent level in both OLS and WLS.  
Our impulse-responses results based on (B − 6) confirm the findings of policy 
variables in the VAR regression. The shocks from grain procurement price and grain 
purchase fund can cause a long-time instability to food production respectively. But 
the response to food subsidy shock is weak. This confirms further our empirical 
findings regarding China’s food coupon system which ended in 1993. Interestingly, 
different from the regression result, food production shows a very quick adjustment to 
restore equilibrium. It indicates that agricultural technology developed, although 
gradually, to make food production stable again after a shock to physical inputs. But 
compared with physical inputs, food production in China was more vulnerable and 
sensitive to policy changes.  
In all, these empirical results are reasonable since all three new variables played a 
major part in government fiscal expenditure for grain procurement between 1979 and 
2006. The largest component of urban subsidy – the grain coupons – was in place from 
1979 to 1993. The Wald joint causality test and impulse-response empirical results also 
confirm food policy intensity in Table 3.  
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Figure 1. Fluctuations in Food Output and Per Capita Food Stock, 1979–2006 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2007).  
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Figure 2. Urban Food Price Subsidies and Government Food Expenditure  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian (Finance Yearbook of China) (Beijing: China’s Finance Magazine, 1991–2007).  
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses in the Production-Inputs-Policy VAR 
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Note: The shock corresponds to one standard deviation of the residual in each variable.  
  
Figure 4. Changes in Policies and Food Security, 1979–2006  
 
Note: 
a
 
b
 The rice procurement price index excludes the weight of the current year’s consumer price index.  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2013); Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo 
Caizheng Nianjian (Finance Yearbook of China) (Beijing: China’s Finance Press, 1991–2013); National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo Jiage Tongji Nianjian (China Price 
Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2013); Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian (China Agriculture Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s 
Agriculture Press, 1980–2013).  
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Figure 5. Reduction of Government Involvement to Give Way to the Market  
 
Source: The same as Figure 2. 
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Figure 6. Grain Production under State Monopsony 
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 Figure 7. Ending of Food Subsidies  
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Figure 9. Food Price Conversion during the Reforms 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Data, <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/>, accessed 29 January 2016; National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo 
Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China’s Statistics Press, 1981–2007). 
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